Japan’s Treasury sales are not simply FX interventions. By selling long-duration U.S. Treasuries, the MoF shifts duration risk into a fragile market increasingly dependent on leveraged hedge funds and, ultimately, Federal Reserve support. At the same time, the resulting dollar liquidity strengthens Japanese banks by lowering their reliance on costly FX swaps, improving profitability and funding flexibility. The author argues this process weakens the structural bearish case for the yen, while for
Many view Japan’s FX interventions as a form of QT. They are not. The Bank of Japan is not selling U.S. Treasuries because it owns very few of them; the seller is the Ministry of Finance. USTs are simply converted into USD cash and transferred to Japanese banks in exchange for yen. The temporary reserve drain at the BoJ is quickly reversed as the MoF spends the yen back into the system. The “failed intervention” narrative is largely a misunderstanding of balance sheets and settlement timing.