Gold's value under a classical gold standard can be viewed as a "Max of Maxes": in each country it reflects the higher of its monetary value or its commodity/jewelry value, while globally it gravitates toward the highest-valued use anywhere in the world. Gold flows toward regions where it commands the most goods and services, linking specie movements to productivity and trade. Unlike Bitcoin, gold retains a non-monetary valuation floor and a unique role in international settlement.
Japan’s Treasury sales are not simply FX interventions. By selling long-duration U.S. Treasuries, the MoF shifts duration risk into a fragile market increasingly dependent on leveraged hedge funds and, ultimately, Federal Reserve support. At the same time, the resulting dollar liquidity strengthens Japanese banks by lowering their reliance on costly FX swaps, improving profitability and funding flexibility. The author argues this process weakens the structural bearish case for the yen, while for
Many view Japan’s FX interventions as a form of QT. They are not. The Bank of Japan is not selling U.S. Treasuries because it owns very few of them; the seller is the Ministry of Finance. USTs are simply converted into USD cash and transferred to Japanese banks in exchange for yen. The temporary reserve drain at the BoJ is quickly reversed as the MoF spends the yen back into the system. The “failed intervention” narrative is largely a misunderstanding of balance sheets and settlement timing.
BYD/CATL/Tesla built empires on LFP patents invalidated (basically stolen) in China. Michel Armand, who enabled China's LFP boom via nanocoating tech, now leads polymer solid-state battery development at Basquevolt (Europe) with ironclad global patents. Chinese giants locked out of next-gen tech. Tesla pivots to robotaxis/robots, unable to compete. Ford allies with Renault/Ampere for access. Chinese battery valuations face severe correction if they can’t find an answer quickly on solid state.
Four years into the AI surge, the promised productivity boom is exposed as an asset-backed consumption binge, characterized by rising trade deficits and massive imports of hardware and power infrastructure. Instead of exporting high-margin APIs, the U.S. is financing this consumption by selling off financial assets, creating a scenario where spending consistently exceeds domestic production.
Drawing on Henry Thornton’s theory of credit, this piece argues that sovereign credit depends on trust, legal security, and respect for property. Policies aimed at expanding US oil production by pressuring major creditor nations such as Norway, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia risk undermining that trust. A debtor cannot strengthen its credit by threatening the interests of its creditors; doing so weakens confidence and ultimately damages the credibility of the United States itself
Britain’s 1820s debt “coupon recuts” reduced government bond yields after war-driven debt surged, pushing investors into speculative bubbles before a banking panic followed. Today, Fed monetization, distorted inflation metrics, and weakening credit markets are seen as a modern parallel, fueling excess speculation in AI, crypto, fintech, and space stocks. As private credit deteriorates and losses emerge, the risk of a broader liquidation cycle continues to rise.
Markets reward truly extraordinary businesses with premiums far above book value — but today, everybody seems “extraordinary.” Humans struggle to accept absurdity and instead rationalize contradictions. Increasingly, LLMs do the same: rather than confronting irrational valuations, they manufacture coherence. If you refuse to “fudge the absurd,” you eventually end up living mentally on the other side of the mirror. Laugh or cry, your choice.
War embargoes trigger a recurring cycle: supply shocks drive price spikes, speculation surges, trade routes shift, and liquidity tightens. The Civil War cotton crisis mirrors the 1970s oil shocks and today’s energy markets—featuring demand destruction, falling real incomes, and cost-push inflation. These booms end in crashes, as capital misallocation and banking stress unwind the speculative excess.